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2007 SYMPOSIUM ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION
Like the proverbial elephant, law school appears different
when perceived from different perspectives. During my twenty years
as a law professor, I saw law school as a professional training
program, a legal research institute, and a wonderful group of
academic colleagues. The articles in this Symposium on the Future of
Legal Education, based on a conference held at Vanderbilt in spring of
2006, generally view law school from a similar perspective. Now that
I'm a Provost, my perspective is different. This raises some new
issues, but it also underscores the basic theme of the Symposium.
Law schools, like business schools, public policy schools and
undergraduate programs, are largely tuition- supported institutions,
although supplemented in essential ways by private donations. This is
possible because their students are capable of paying the steadily
increasing tuition (often with the help of federal loans, of course), and
neither the teaching nor the faculty research relies on the extensive
use of technology or large empirical data sets. Medical and
engineering schools also have tuition-paying students, but the
technological demands of both the teaching and research means that
their tuition and donation revenue must be heavily supplemented by
grants. In graduate programs, the students generally don't (and often
simply can't) pay the tuition, and some fields are subject to
technological and empirical demands as well; consequently, these
programs must be subsidized by other sources, including grants and
related support.
To many Provosts, the fact that law schools are largely tuitionsupported means that they do not need to receive funding from central
university sources. In fact, they can be regarded as a source of funds
for other university programs-to continue the theme of large grazing
animals, they are cash cows. More importantly, in my view, the fact
that law schools are tuition-driven means that their economic viability
depends on factors that are outside their control-in particular, on the
gatekeeper degree that they award and on the economic health of the
field for which they are training their students.
325
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In granting a gatekeeper degree, law schools are similar to
medical schools and engineering schools, but unlike business or public
policy schools. Not only is a degree required to practice law, or, more
precisely, to take the qualifying exam for legal practice, but that
degree must be provided by a university. A few states, most notably
California, allow proprietary institutions to offer the required degree,
but the vast majority forbid this. As a result, law schools are not in
competition with other types of training institutions, nor with
employers who are willing to shoulder the training costs themselves.
This fortunate situation is determined by political decisions that lie
outside the direct control of universities.
But the law schools' monopoly over the training of lawyers will
not count for very much unless their students continue to command
the handsome salaries that enable them to pay off their loans, or,
more generally, that justify the cost of the degree. This depends on the
continued economic health of the legal profession. In fact, the
profession must not be merely healthy, but robust; it must continue to
demand large numbers of entry level practitioners, and must continue
offering them salaries far above the national median. Moreover, the
viability of research-oriented law schools, including all the schools
where this Symposium's authors teach, requires that employers must
be willing to pay a substantial premium to the high-achieving
students that these schools attract and produce.
Another feature of law schools, when viewed from a Provost's
perspective, is that its educational model involves three years of
classroom instruction. Business and public policy schools grant their
degrees after two years, and sometimes less; medical students spend
four year in school, but by the third year the educational program is
largely clinical in nature. Until the 1870s, legal training in the United
States followed an apprenticeship model, with virtually no classroom
instruction at all, and no credentialing. Having adopted an exclusively
classroom model for the pre-credential process, law schools have
gradually reincorporated the apprenticeship approach through liveclient clinics, simulations, and externships. But the process has been
less than successful or comprehensive, and these various experiential
modes of education have not been fully integrated into the academic
curriculum.
It would not be inconceivable to organize a law school the third
year of which consisted exclusively of experiential learning, or indeed,
of paid apprenticeships. For that matter, the entire educational
experience could be reorganized as an apprenticeship program, with
the law school running its own law firm, and representing fee-paying
as well as public interest clients. Medical schools, after all, sometimes
are part of a university medical center which owns and operates its
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own hospitals and clinics. They serve fee-paying patients as well as
the poor. A law school of this sort might be less expensive to run, and
its curriculum might prepare students more effectively for modern
legal practice. Several law schools, including a few of the surprisingly
large number that have been founded in the past few decades, have
made gestures toward experiential approaches of this sort, but none
have ventured particularly far from the traditional model.
One final feature that seems to me worth noting is that both
the teaching and research in law school is distinctly different from
that of any other university department. The most striking feature of
law school teaching is the Socratic Method, a question-and-answer
format that to some resembles fraternity hazing more closely than
Socrates's subtly subversive inquiries. As law students progress into
their second and third years, the lectures courses and seminars begin
to resemble classroom teaching in other university departments, but
reverberations of the first year Socratic Method continue to the end.
Legal research is equally distinctive. To begin with, it is dominated by
articles, not books, and those articles tend to be much longer, and
much more heavily footnoted, than articles in other disciplines. They
are also more normative than scholarship in most other fields, with
the possible exception of philosophy; the task of describing legislation,
judicial decision making, or private legal behavior is often taken up by
other departments, such as political science and sociology. Perhaps
most notably, scholarly articles in law are not reviewed and edited by
the authors' peers, but by law students, a feature that often leads
faculty members in other departments to wonder whether these
articles should even count as scholarship.
What sort of institutional behaviors have resulted from these
distinctive features? One notable behavior, from the university
perspective, is that law schools have been largely self-contained.
Because they are economically viable concerns, supported largely by
their own endowment, giving, and tuition, they often strive to
establish and preserve their autonomy from the rest of the university.
The distinctive features of their teaching and research contribute to
this desire to function as an independent institution that happens to
be in the same location, and have the same name, as the rest of the
university. Another behavior of note is law schools' relative isolation
from the outside world, a product of their emphasis on classroom
teaching, and perhaps the gatekeeper degree that precludes employers
or proprietary institutions from placing any competitive pressure on
the law schools' educational approach. Finally, the self-contained,
isolated character of law schools has allowed them to be resistant to
curricular change. Their separation from the general educational
currents of the university has left their teaching program
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longstanding, not surprising perhaps given the role of tradition and
precedent. I know of no other university department that uses the
same pedagogic approach that it did 100 years ago, or bases its first
year of education on largely the same basic conceptual categories.
What then can be said of about the future of American legal
education from the university perspective? Clearly, the ability to
continue in anything resembling their present form depends on two
factors over which universities lack direct control-their monopoly of
legal education, and the continued economic health of the legal
profession. It is easy to be pessimistic or even apocalyptic about either
of these factors, particularly the second. But the U.S. economy has
continued to flourish, despite the relative decline of our
manufacturing and extractive sectors, on the basis of our service and
knowledge-based activities. Legal services, particularly the highly
specialized ones that large- and middle-sized law firms now provide,
fall comfortably within these categories. Nonetheless, even small
changes in the monopoly of law schools, perhaps as a result of distance
learning, or in the economic health of the legal profession, perhaps
because of increased foreign competition, may compel law schools to
retrench or seek help from their universities.
Even beyond these fiscal concerns, law school efforts to
maintain their autonomy from both the university and the outside
world are, to many increasingly outmoded and counter-productive.
The three years of classroom education have consistently been
challenged; third year students, with many securing employment and
experiencing practice, may verge on the "bored and restless." The
relationship with a pedagogic methodology and a curriculum that is a
century old may exacerbate these problems. Patience with the Socratic
Method may be wearing thin; the ritualistic "hazing" that it involves
has been powerfully challenged as increasingly less appropriate for
today's diverse student population. At the same time, the style of legal
scholarship that focused on the internal logic of decided cases and on
the intricacies of legal doctrine has set astride a growth in a parallel
system of research and discovery. Legal research is becoming more
empirical and more interdisciplinary, and law schools are increasingly
likely to hire entry level faculty with academic training in fields other
than law.
As long as their economic viability remains intact, law schools
will able to maintain their relative autonomy; in fact, elite law schools
at public institutions such as Michigan, Virginia, Berkeley, UCLA,
and Texas seem to be moving further in this direction, at least fiscally.
But from a Provost's perspective, I agree with many of the articles in
this Symposium that continued isolation does not represent the future
of legal education. Law schools have a great deal to gain from their
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participation in the intellectual discourse of the university. The
subject of study in other departments is directly relevant to legal
teaching and research, as law becomes more specialized, and more
intimately involved with the subjects that it addresses, from either a
policy or private practice perspective. The research methodologies of
these other departments, particularly those that are empirically
based, are increasingly important to the intellectual vitality of legal
scholarship. Their pedagogic ideas, and their willingness to update the
content of their curriculums in response to changing circumstances,
provide a model for change in legal education; law schools can look to
these other departments for ideas that would lead them out of their
current educational malaise. These efforts, by involving the law school
more intimately with so many parts of the university, will require law
schools to relinquish some of their fiscal and administrative
autonomy. But at any university that is committed to excellence in all
fields of instruction and research, the trade-off will be more than
worth it.
The first two articles in the Symposium discuss the history of
legal education and the forces that have acted on it. Robert Gordon
describes the way the modern legal education, with its characteristic
case law method, originated at Harvard Law School in the 1870s, the
way it became dominant, and the way it preserved itself by resisting
changes that were occurring in society at large. As he notes: "In law
schools policy studies by 1920 were even more peripheral than they
had been in 1870, driven out by the Langdellian private-law casemethod curriculum. For as the Harvard model proliferated, it exiled or
marginalized both the traditional and the newer (Progressive)
alternative curricula, sending them off to separate departments or
confining them to the law schools' graduate programs." Changes have
occurred however. Professor Gordon traces the development of elective
courses in the second and third years, and the gradual evolution of the
basic Constitutional Law and Torts courses, as reflected in the
changing casebooks that these courses use. While he sees some
evidence
that
new
intellectual
approaches,
particularly
interdisciplinary scholarship, have influenced the way these courses
are taught, he concludes that "[i]nterdisciplinary approaches have,
however, affected scholarship more than teaching, because traditional
teaching materials, and especially the case method, continue to act as
a brake on innovation."
John Henry Schlegel traces the common law origins of the
Langdellian curriculum, and attributes the difficulty in reforming it to
our inherited conceptual categories. He notes that there is no standard
first year course that is based on statutory law, although the modern
legal system is predominantly statute-based, nor has contracts moved
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beyond its common law origins to incorporate modern commercial law.
Another factor discouraging change is that the common law focus
makes legal scholarship an easy and convenient task for law
professors-no "messy social science fieldwork," no need to know much
about what lawyers actually do. Professor Schlegel then offers a vision
of a law school whose curriculum reflected modern legal practice.
Today's lawyers, he says, rarely go to court or conduct legal research;
rather, they engage in a complex process of advising, negotiating and
planning that mediates between legal doctrine and pragmatic action.
Thus, a modern law school should devote its first year to teaching
doctrinal structures and methods, legal practices, and legal writing,
together with the administrative, economic, and social background of
the legal system. In the second year, students would explore two
practice areas in detail, and then they would be done; the third year,
Professor Schlegel suggests, is a waste of time.
In the next section of the Symposium, which offers varying
perspectives on legal education, Wayne Hyatt, a practitioner and parttime academic, underscores several of the concerns raised by Professor
Schlegel. Legal education, he points out, fails to reflect the needs of its
consumers-specifically, the firms and departments that hire law
school graduates. He argues that legal educators must abandon their
disdain for the practice and practitioners of law in order to better
prepare their students to contribute to the legal profession and
experience rewarding careers. They should not only teach their
students to "think like a lawyer," but to be a "professional." That is,
students must enter the profession with a sense of integrity, the
ability to read and to understand people; the ability to solve-not just
spot-problems, and an understanding of the multidisciplinary nature
of most transactions.
Lloyd Weinrib's jurisprudentially oriented article dissents from
the two preceding articles in its premise, but interestingly, agrees
with them in its conclusion. The purpose of law school, according to
Professor Weinrib, is not to serve the legal profession, but to serve the
university in its primary mission of caring for and developing the
"intellectual inheritance of civilization." But this does not mean that
law schools should ignore the realities of modern legal practice: "The
university study of law can. .. be nothing other than the study of the
practice of law." Focusing on private law, Professor Weinrib finds that
this essential mission has been sidetracked by the instrumentalist
approach to law, as typified by the law and economics movement,
because it "effaces the very concepts that are constitutive of the [legal]
reasoning process" and "negates rather than explains the concepts
supposedly being analysed." In addition, instrumentalism ignores the
direct relationship between the parties that is central to private law,
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and substitutes a public law approach directed to the general public
good. Private law, Professor Weinrib argues, is a normative structure
based on a series of coherent concepts, and legal education, at least for
private law, must focus on these essentially legal concepts. Although
he sees the law school's primary service to the university in the
communication of these concepts, Professor Weinrib is not opposed to
interdisciplinary study. But such study should not involve the
colonization of law by other disciplines and the displacement of the
concepts central to legal practice; rather it should be a genuine
interchange, a means of "creating an academic conversation with
different disciplinary voices."
Another partial dissent comes from Mark West's comparative
study of legal education in Japan. He describes the shift from
European-style legal education, where law is an undergraduate major,
to three-year graduate level law schools of the sort that Langdell
initiated at Harvard and now prevails throughout the United States.
(Interestingly, a Japanese student who majors in law as an
undergraduate can complete law school in two years.) The shift to the
American structure for law schools has been accompanied by an
increased interest in American pedagogic techniques, such as the
Socratic Method and clinical education. This sea change in Japanese
legal education was motivated by the perceived need to increase the
number of people who pass the bar examination and become practicing
lawyers. But even with this reform, the number of practicing lawyers
will remain relatively small, and lawyers will continue to focus on
high-end, corporate litigation. The low end disputes involving
individuals that are handled by lawyers in the United States, such as
landlord-tenant cases, consumer bankruptcy, and debt collection, are
addressed by gangsters (yakuza) in Japan. Unlike Japanese lawyers,
the yakuza are "innovative, diverse, entrepreneurial, and proactive."
Professor West thus paints a picture of American legal education, at
least when seen from overseas, as both an inspirational model and a
pragmatic response to our nation's legal needs.
The next three articles focus on the culture and atmosphere of
law school, and particularly the classroom experience. Two of these
articles describe empirical studies that provide much more detailed
insights into the classroom experience and related matters than the
previous anecdotal accounts. Bonita London, Geraldine Downey, and
Shauna Mace, all psychologists, begin by identifying the influences on
students' sense of engagement. These include institutional factors
such as the method of evaluation, situational factors such as pedagogic
practices, and individual factors, such as each student's sense of his or
her own competence. Standard methods of assessing these factors, and
student engagement in general, involve general surveys that suffer
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from limitations on the students' memories of their actual experiences.
Instead, the authors designed a longitudinal that of students entering
an urban, elite law school that required student volunteers to record
their immediate experiences at the end of each day during their first
three weeks of law school. They find that a number of students
reported feelings of alienation based on social factors such as their
gender, race, or socioeconomic status. Many students also found the
Socratic Method alienating, and observed that the discomfort it
induced interfered with their ability to learn. Experiences that
increased students' sense of engagement included peer support, the
acknowledgement of their concerns by faculty members, and their
growing mastery of the subject matter. The authors conclude that law
schools would benefit from greater diversity, and the introduction of
more collaborative and cooperative pedagogic practices.
Elizabeth Mertz's article describes a study of the linguistic
interactions between professors and students in the first year classes
of eight different law schools. In each school, the entire first semester
of classes was tape-recorded, transcribed, and coded while in-class
observers also coded aspects of the classroom interactions. As a result,
the researchers were able to determine the length of each in-class
interaction between professor and student, the gender and race of the
speakers, whether the student had been called on or had volunteered,
and numerous other features of the classroom process. Professor
Mertz finds that law professors use the Socratic Method to re-focus
student attention from questions of content to questions of authority.
In discussing cases, professors insist on precise identification
authority issues, sometimes to the point of demanding an exact
repetition of the opinion's language, but encourage a highly
speculative reconstruction of the litigants' underlying interaction that
converts it into legal discourse. The result is to create a "closed
linguistic system which is capable of in essence gobbling up all
manner of social detail without budging its core assumptions."
Professor Mertz also found that women and minority students
participate less frequently in classroom discussions unless the faculty
member is also a woman or minority group member-still another way
that the classroom experience narrows the range of possible discourses
about law.
Taking a less empirical and more interpretive approach to the
same topic, Susan Sturm and Lani Guinier argue that the classroom
experience is part of law school's "culture of competition and
conformity." It emphasizes conflict in both its content and its
pedagogic methodology. Presenting law to students through the
medium of decided cases, and under-emphasizing statutes, treaties,
contracts, and informal agreements creates an image of law as
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essentially adversarial. "The conventional law school classroom
mirrors adjudication's adversarial, formal idea of conflict" by its use of
the Socratic Method, which resembles either a trial lawyer's cross
examination of a witness or an appellate judge's pointed interrogation
of a lawyer. In addition, the law school's emphasis on classroom
instruction conveys the message that legal expertise is abstract and
formal, to be gained by passively absorbing information from a
hierarchical superior, rather contextual and interpersonal, to be
mastered by self-motivated learning under experienced guidance. This
instruction tends to be sharply separated from the students' efforts to
define their professional identity and determine their career
objectives. Professors Sturm and Guinier find that this competitive,
adversarial culture breeds a narrow concept of law and legal education
that undermines efforts to reform the curriculum. Students want to
conform to the dominant norms in order to get ahead, and shun
innovative programs or unique experiences. The only way out, in the
authors' view, is to make "law school culture an integral part of the
conversation about law school reform."
The final three articles in the Symposium present global
critiques of legal education and offer programs for change that have
been planned or implemented in leading law schools. Carrie MenkelMeadow notes that legal education has remained relatively unchanged
in the past few decades, unlike professional schools for medicine and
business, which have "reinvented" themselves during this period. She
suggests that the path to educational renewal in law involves the
recognition that "the study of law itself [is] necessarily a multidisciplinary enterprise, borrowing from or using the insights, methods
and canons of other fields to tell us about how we govern ourselves."
After reviewing the history of legal education since Langdell, and the
various efforts that movements such as legal realism, legal process,
law and economics, socio-legal studies, critical legal studies, law and
literature, feminism, critical race theory and clinical education have
undertaken to bring a broader, more interdisciplinary approach to law
school teaching, Professor Menkel-Meadow proposes a new method of
legal study, "organized around a 'holy trinity' of temporal approaches
to law-before, during, and after 'the law.'" To that end, she proposes
that law students should take not only traditional courses, but also
classes which inform them how and why law is made, such as
anthropology, political science, and sociology. In their second and third
years, students could specialize in particular areas of the law and
participate in clinical programs. She proposes that students should
also receive training in basic legal skills such as counseling,
negotiation, and fact investigation.
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Professor Menkel-Meadow provides concrete examples of
interdisciplinary programs currently in practice that represent both
modest and expansive reforms to traditional legal education: two at
Georgetown University Law Center and one at Centro de
Investigacion y Docencia Economicas in Mexico City. The first and
more modest of the Georgetown programs is "Week One: Law in a
Global Context." In the first week of their second semester, students
engage in an intensive investigation of the three international law
problems that draw on a number of different disciplinary areas. The
second program is Curriculum B, a specially designed set of courses
offered to one quarter of Georgetown's daytime students. Featuring
courses such as Legal Process and Society, Democracy and Coercion,
and Government Processes, its declared goal is to "1) reconceive
separate subject matters in terms of common problems such as
incentives, distribution and social control; 2) fully take into account
the emergence of the regulatory state and pervasive legislation in
most common law areas; 3) invoke other academic disciplines as they
bear on law and 4) teach theory, as well as doctrinal analysis of law."
These two efforts clearly represent one of the most dramatic
innovations in legal education that has occurred in the post-War era,
certain one of the most dramatic innovations that remains in
operation.
In the next article, Todd Rakoff and Martha Minow second
Professor Menkel-Meadow's assessment: "The plain fact is that
American legal education, and especially its formative first year,
remains remarkably similar to the curriculum invented at the
Harvard Law School by Christopher Columbus Langdell over a
century and a quarter ago." Its staying power, Professors Rakoff and
Minow suggest, lies in the multiple purposes that Langdell's case law
method serves; it teaches students how to reason from particular legal
materials to general principles, it connects to a recognizable aspect of
legal practice, it is easy to use, and the necessary materials are easy to
acquire. But the method has serious limitations. It treats "too many
dimensions as already fixed." In an appellate case, the facts have
already been determined, the issues already defined, and range of
possible responses constrained by the institutional setting. This does
not reflect the experience of practicing lawyers, who must analyze
problems from various perspectives, devise alternative approaches,
and remain open to a variety of solutions.
To resolve some of these problems with legal education,
Professors Rakoff and Minow propose a shift from the case law method
used in law schools to the case method used in business schools and
other types of professional education. "Students ought to be presented
with relatively dense materials that lay out a situation, experienced as
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a problem for a person or group of people, for legal treatment." In
these materials, a decided case, if it appeared at all, would be just one
event in an extended interaction between the parties and a variety of
other actors. Professors Rakoff and Minow identify themselves as
members of a committee that proposed this approach to the Harvard
faculty. Rather than adopting the case method in all its existing
classes, the faculty, by unanimous vote, added three courses to the
first year curriculum-Legislation and Regulation, a set of three
alternative courses on globalization, and an intensive course on
Problems and Theories. Although different from the approach
proposed by Professors Rakoff and Minow, this reform shares the
same underlying aspiration of exposing first-year law students to a
broader array of methodologies and issues than the Langdellian
curriculum provides.
The final article in the Symposium, by Edward Rubin, also
centers on the lack of change in legal education. The Langdellian
curriculum, Dean Rubin argues, and particularly its mandatory first
year, was up-to-date at the time it was developed, but became obsolete
a mere thirty or forty years later due to dramatic legal and conceptual
changes in the 1890s. To begin with, there was no administrative
state at the federal level when Langdell developed his curriculum. In
the immediately following decades, however, the Progressive
Movement spawned a host of federal agencies that rendered this
curriculum's exclusive focus on the common law outdated. Second,
there was no knowledge of the common law's real history, but instead
the myth that it embodied unarticulated principles that had existed
since time immemorial. In the 1890s, Pollack and Maitland
demonstrated that the common law was the specific creation of the
Angevin monarchy to extend its power, thus undermining the
rationale for Langdell's idea that students should read cases to discern
such underlying principles. Third, there was no social science in the
United States when Langdell developed his curriculum, and he thus
relied on natural science as a model for his approach. Rapid
intellectual advances in the following decades provided the more
appropriate model of social science, and offered methodologies for
studying law as a social practice, rather than merely a body of
doctrine. Finally, the prevailing belief in Langdell's day was that
education was a process of training the rational mind. Shortly
thereafter, theories of learner-centered education, particularly those of
John Dewey, suggested that learning is a developmental process
where the students' capacities and interest change as their mastery
increases.
Recognition of these conceptual developments, which have now
been established for 100 years, would produce dramatic changes in the
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law school curriculum. First-year students should be introduced to the
realities of the administrative state as well as to the common law and
learn to read statutes and regulations as well as cases. Law should be
viewed as social policy, rather than embodied principles, and studied
by social science methodology; thus, the upper class curriculum should
enable students to focus on a particular area of legal practice in depth,
and study it from an interdisciplinary perspective. The curriculum as
a whole should progress from the first year to the third. First-year
students should receive foundational training in all basic areas of law,
rather than studying selected common law subjects at the same level
of detail as the statutory subjects they will study in subsequent years,
and third-year students should be able to pursue individual projects,
with professorial guidance of a more sophisticated and collegial
nature.
Rubin is the dean of our Law School at Vanderbilt. There are
few legal scholars who have given greater thought to rethinking and
modernizing legal education. Of course, as is clear to all deans,
faculty, students, and alumni, this is a collective and political
enterprise of the entire law school and university community, and will
ultimately be based on the ideas of many faculty members, students,
and alumni. Indeed, while from the Provost's "seat" any effort at
curriculum reform can often be a quagmire, Vanderbilt is on the path
of exciting and bold steps in curriculum innovation. Thus the
underlying goal, which Rubin's article and so many of the other
articles in this Symposium have urged, is to scrutinize and modernize
the Langdellian curriculum and develop a new mode of legal education
that is more consistent with modern thinking about law, more
interdisciplinary, and more relevant to the twenty-first century
practice of law.
Significantly, doing so will allow great law schools to take full
advantage of being part of a great university.
It requires top
university administrators to abandon their set ways of thinking about
law schools in the university setting. That is, we cannot look
avariciously at the tuition margins and use law schools as net
exporters of cash to buttress the university's bottom line. We cannot
be uninformed critics of the modes, methods, and outlets for legal
scholarship. And we cannot be the source and repository of antilawyer rhetoric. All ordered and free societies depend upon law and
upon lawyers trained in fundamental principles of adjudication,
fairness, equality, and compensation. By isolating, overtaxing, or
being the source of jejune ramblings about our law schools and
lawyers, we turn our backs on that agreed to by all of our
commentators-conceptualist, realist, or pragmatist. Law and the
study of legal institutions is essential to our most basic human values
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and aspirations. Viewed against this backdrop, rethinking curriculum
is a critical part of the mission of a university that seeks to be called
great.
Nicholas S. Zeppos
Provost and Vice Chancellorfor Academic Affairs; Professorof Law

